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Abstract
When people have hierarchic preferences inequality aﬀects innovation-driven growth through the implied
demand distribution over new goods. The paper examines the demand path of the firm through its life-
cycle and analyzes the eﬃciency of dynamic resource allocation under diﬀerent inequality scenarios. Unlike
previous models of inequality and demand induced innovation, the innovators are protected by patents of
finite length. Longer patents increase the profitability of an innovation because they reduce the eﬀect of
inequality by increasing the likelihood that the firms benefit from a future demand jump in sales to the
poor. This result does not hold, however, when initial inequality is low or the purchasing power of the poor
is high. Moreover, reducing inequality does not increase growth as long as the amount of redistribution is
below a threshold level.
JEL classification: 014,015,031,H23
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1 Introduction
What is the eﬀect of income distribution on incentives to innovate when innovators can not protect their
monopoly position forever? In a static world, inequality aﬀects market size for innovators because richer
consumers purchase more of the new goods than poor consumers. In a dynamic setup, changes in inequality
bring about demand increase and decreases for a particular item which aﬀects its innovator’s expected profit
flow and its decision whether to invest in research and development. For instance, a decrease in inequality might
push the profit flow earlier in the life cycle, thereby increasing the net present value of ongoing innovations. On
the other hand, a decrease in inequality might lead to a lower return on innovation if a redistribution causes
consumers to spend less on newer goods. While the former is a desirable outcome from a policy perspective,
the innovator might still opt to stay out if limits on patent protection prevent gains from a reduction in
inequality. Finally, the duration of patents might be irrelevant to the choice of entry if the purchasing power
is high enough such that all new goods are already consumed by everyone.
This article analyzes the eﬀect of inequality on innovation-driven growth when innovations are protected by
patents of finite length. The eﬀect of income or wealth inequality on incentives to innovate has been analyzed
by a small group of researchers who have generally taken the monopoly duration to be infinite. Foellmi and
Zweimuller (2006) and Zweimuller (2000) study the eﬀect of inequality on innovation-based growth when
people have non-homothetic preferences. In their setup, once the innovators enter the market, they maintain
monopoly positions forever by virtue of infinite patents. The length of the patents in this paper, along with
inequality and the growth rate, is one of the determinants of the regime in which the economy operates. Patents
and the duration of the monopolistic state determine, for instance, who can aﬀord an eﬃciently produced or
a luxury product ex-ante.
This paper builds on previous work by relaxing the assumption that innovators are protected by patents of
infinite length. In most of the quality-ladder models, this assumption is made for the purpose of tractability.
However, within the set of models where inequality aﬀects innovation-driven growth through the composition
of demand, limited duration of monopolistic power has substantially diﬀerent implications for the inequality-
growth relationship. The market size for an innovation and its profitability might be aﬀected by a change
in inequality or a change in both the level and growth rate of income. However, when patents are finite the
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profitability of an innovation and incentives for a firm to innovate might be immune to fluctuations in inequality
or income. In other words, when faced with increased or decreased demand, innovators might find themselves
already in perfect competition if their patents expire early enough. Such a situation might arise either when
patent duration is too short, inequality is too high or incomes are too low at the time of the innovator’s entry
into the market. In this setup there are several aspects of the relationship between inequality and incentives to
innovate that are worth mentioning. First, it is not only the shape of the wealth distribution that is important
to growth, but also the length of time that the innovator expects to survive as a monopolist, which aﬀects its
decision to enter the market. Second, it is not only the level of inequality that matters for the evolution of
markets but also how fast the inequality changes . And finally, the growth rate and the duration of monopoly
status jointly determine the nature of the relationship between inequality and innovation-driven growth.
Given a low initial level of inequality, an increase in the average income or a decrease in inequality might
cause ineﬃciently produced luxuries to be consumed in equilibrium. Resources are thus tied up which would
otherwise be used in more eﬃcient production. This is an equilibrium with lower growth, which is most likely
to occur if the average income is high. In such a situation, reducing inequality beyond a certain threshold
reverses the inequality growth relationship. On the other hand, if the average income is too low, reducing
inequality fosters growth as long as the innovator’s product is already consumed by the rich. If the quality
item is too expensive for both rich and the poor, then increasing inequality might foster growth by bringing the
profit flow earlier so that the innovator can enjoy profits before his patent expires. In this setup, the position
of the most recent innovator’s entry in the hierarchy of needs and the duration of its status as a monopoly are
two important determinants of the relationship between inequality and innovation-growth.
This article is also linked to the strand of literature that studies the eﬀect of patent length on innovation
rate. Judd (1985) shows in a general equilibrium framework that infinitely lived patents do not necessarily
produce a socially optimal level of innovation. Horowitz and Lai(1996) find that longer patents increase the
size, but decrease the frequency of innovations. This dichotomy gives rise to a situation in which social welfare
and the rate of innovations can not be simultaneously maximized by optimally choosing a patent length.
Laussel and Nyssena (1999) show that assuming a finite life time for patents results in multiple equilibria,
a result also confirmed by our analysis. This article diﬀers from the above papers in that it focuses on the
eﬀect of wealth inequality on the rate of innovations and analyzes the role of patent length as it pertains to
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the relationship between inequality and growth.
Demand side eﬀects on innovation have been studied by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) who take
the menu of available goods to be fixed. As in Matsuyama (2002), our model ranks diﬀerent goods according
to priority and new goods are initially aﬀorded only by the rich and finally become necessities. Greenwood
and Mukoyama (2001) analyze how income distribution aﬀects innovation incentives in a partial equilibrium
context. Li (1996) has a premise which is similar to ours but assumes that consumers diﬀer in their labour
endowments which are uniformly distributed across households. The assumption of a uniform distribution has
the disadvantage that only one dimension of inequality - the range of the distribution - can be studied. A
similar paper by Chou and Talmain (1996) considers again a single type demand pattern in a Schumpeterian
setup where all consumers, rich and poor, consume all products.
In the next section we introduce the model. In the third section, we characterize the equilibrium in this
economy and we present the main arguments of the paper, and in section four we provide further arguments
and some applications. Section five concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Technology
The technology is similar to previous models of quality-ladders such as Romer (1987,1990), Grossman and
Helpman’s (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) with slight modifications1. There are two types of technology,
old and new. New technology is available only after research and development. Old technology, on the other
hand, brings constant returns and access to it is free. New technology is either an innovation which is a new
product replacing an existing product or a new method of production for an existing product. The innovator
firms are granted patents which allow them to operate monopolistically for some constant amount of time
η. In this economy the only factor of production is labour. The old firms require aold(t) units of labour per
output. To make an innovation ard(t) units of labour are needed. After innovation the firm can produce with
1Romer’s (1987,1990) and Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) models assume innovations take place in the intermediate goods
sector and/or innovators introduce new but additional products. In Aghion and Howitt (1992) new products replace old ones but
exist only until the next innovation.
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anew(t) units of labour per output,where anew(t) < aold(t). The growth is driven through innovations and
ard(t) is decreasing in the amount of past innovations due to learning experience. We will also assume that
the labour input requirements in both final goods sectors are decreasing in the amount of past innovations a
la Young (1993). Let n(t) denote the number of innovations up to time t. The input coeﬃcients at any time
is then given by
ai(t) =
ai
n(t)
for i = old, new, rd (1)
This specification implies that any increase in the variable n(t) is a proxy for the increase in the aggregate
knowledge stock which spills over uniformly across all sectors2.
2.2 Firms
The old firms operate in the competitive sector because of constant returns. At any time, the price of an
old firm’s product is given by pold(t) = w(t)aold(t). where w(t) is the wage rate determined in a perfectly
competitive labour market and is the same for all sectors. For simplicity, we will set the price of competitive
products to one for the rest of the article. We will assume that at steady state the economy grows at an
endogenous rate of g. In other words, at steady state n(t) is growing at a rate of g and all labour input
coeﬃcients are decreasing at rate g. Since the productivity growth is uniform across activities of research and
production, one can easily show that the wages increase at the same rate and therefore that the marginal
production costs for all sectors remain constant over time.
The new firms are granted patents that prevent entry by other firms as long as the patented firm charges
the competitive price. The patent allows the firms to operate as monopolists for a certain amount of time.
No monopolistic firm has an incentive to charge a price higher than one which will trigger entry from the
competitive fringe. There is always a competitor out there who can use the older production technology
therefore there is a limit to the price that the innovator can charge. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
monopolistic firm does not charge a price lower than unity which translates to the monopolist not necessarily
choosing the profit maximizing price. The monopolist earns a unit profit of π = 1 − w(t)anew(t). Using (6)
and the wage condition π = 1− aoldanew > 0 which is independent over time. The labour market is competitive
2Note that this diﬀers from Grossman and Helpman (92) where the productivity grows only in research.
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and the wage rate is given by w(t) and is the same for all sectors.
2.3 Consumers
Let ci(t) represent the most luxurious good that consumer i can aﬀord. The lifetime utility of the consumer i
can then be written as:
Ui =
Z ∞
0
ui(t)e−ρtdt =
Z ∞
0
[1 + ln(ci(t))] e−ρtdt (2)
where ρ represents the discount rate3. Consumers own the same wage rate w(t) but diﬀer in their asset
holdings Wi(t). We further assume there is a perfect capital market with interest rate r which is constant at
the steady state. The steady state growth rate is g at which all variables grow including consumption. The
consumer’s problem can then be written as:
max
{ci}
Ui s.t.
Z ∞
0
ci(t)e−rtdt ≤Wi(0) +
Z ∞
0
w(0)(t)e−(r−g)tdt
The optimal consumption path is governed by the following relations:
g = r − ρ (3)
and
ci(0) = w(0) + ρWi(0) (4)
We assume the consumers have a hierarchy of wants j ∈ [0,∞) . A low value of j is associated with basic
needs and a high value of j is associated with luxury needs. Let hp(t) (hr(t)) denote the highest ranked
3See Zweimuller (2000) for the derivation of this utility function.
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want the poor (rich) can aﬀord to satisfy. Then any good j  [0, hp(t)] is bought both by the rich and the
poor whereas any good j (hp(t), hm(t)] ∪ (hm(t), hr(t)]is bought only by the rich where hm(t) is the highest
ranked want satisfied by a monopolist firms product. The number of innovations up to date t ,n(t), is equal
to hm(t). Moreover, let the range [0, hc(t)] denote the firms whose patents have expired and who now operate
competitively. The range where the monopolistic firms still operate is (hc(t), n(t)] and the competitive firms
who serve the “fancies of the rich” operate in the range (n(t), hr(t)] .
The ranking of the product ranges above relies on the assumption that any want can be satisfied by
the products of old firms. The traditional technology is freely available and once there is demand the old
(ineﬃcient) producers can enter without any costs. The new producers on the other hand aim at markets
which have the highest growth potential to justify the R&D costs. This implies that the “fancies of the rich”
market is served by the competitive producers whereas the needs in the middle of the hierarchy is served partly
by the monopolistic producers. The basic goods market is again served by competitive producers with expired
patents. This situation is depicted unidimensionally in Figure 1. Everything moves at a constant rate towards
right and the entry occurs at time t at point n(t) and at time t+ 1 at n(t+ 1). The patent length for a firm
entering at date t is given by the distance between hc(t) and n(t). The same firm has has n(t)−hc(t+1) time
remaining at t+ 1 until its patent expires. At any time, there are three types of demand structure that will
determine the size of these markets.
Case I: hp < hc < n Only the rich can aﬀord monopolistic a firm’s products; in other words the firms
patent expires before the poor can aﬀord its product
Case II: hc < hp < n At least some part of the monopolistic sector products can be aﬀorded by the poor.
Case III : hc < n < hp Both rich and the poor can aﬀord all of the monopolistic firm’s products.
Note that this specification also represents initial inequality levels in aﬀordability or consumption.
FIGURE 1
6
2.4 Income Distribution and Demand Structure:
In this section we closely follow Zweimuller and Foellmi (2006) who consider a simple distribution of wealth
in two groups: rich (r) and poor (p). Both rich and poor earn the same wage but own diﬀerent wealth levels.
Let γi be the ratio of consumer i’s wealth to the average wealth, γi =
Wi
W
, i = p, r. If the population share
of the poor is φ then the fraction of aggregate wealth held by the poor is φγp whereas the rich hold a fraction
of (1− φ)γr. Since φγp + (1− φ)γr = 1, one can write
γr=
1− φγp
1− φ (5)
This relation represents the Lorentz curve. Note that an increase in γp and a decrease in φ (holding γp
constant) leads to less inequality. In this economy, aggregate wealth refers to holdings of a firm’s shares. Let
vk(t) be the present value of firm k’s profit. The aggregate value of the wealth at any time t is then given by
V (t) =
R n(t)
0
vk(t)dk . The value of asset holdings of each consumer is given by
Wi(t) =
γiV (t)
L
i = p, r (6)
where L is population.
2.5 The Resource Constraint
Note that the range (hc(t), n(t)]will be determined by the growth rate, g, and the patent length, η, in the
following manner; n(t+ η) = n(t)e−gη = hc(t). It follows that η = −(1/g) ln(hc(t)/n(t)). Note that the longer
the patent length the smaller the ratio hc(t)/n(t). Moreover, in the steady state this ratio is determined solely
by the patent length since the growth rate becomes a constant.
Let Yi(i = new, old) denote the total production in each sector. Since labour is the only factor of produc-
tion, the employment in the R&D, new and old sectors areLR&D = n˙(t)ard(t), Lnew = Ynew(t)anew(t) and
Lold=Yold(t)aold(t), respectively. The total employment is then
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L = n˙(t)ard(t) + Ynew(t)anew(t) + Yold(t)aold(t) (7)
In a steady state situation hp, hr and n grow at the same rate. Using the definitions dp =
hp(t)
n , dr =
hr(t)
n , dc =
hc(t)
n , g =
n˙
n and equation (7), we can write the resource constraint in each type of demand structure
above respectively as4:
Case I : L = ardg + anew [(1− φ)(1− dc)]L+ aold [(1− φ)(dr − 1)L+ dp] (8)
Case II : L = ardg + anew [φdp + (1− φ)(1− dc)]L+ aold [(1− φ)(dr − 1)L+ dc]
Case III : L = ardg + anew(1− dc)L+ aold [(1− φ)(dr − 1)L+ φL(dp − 1) + dc]
2.6 The Value of A Monopolistic Firm
At any time, the market size for each firm will depend on the number of people who can aﬀord its good. Incomes
grow over time and some firms anticipate a larger market because more people will be able to aﬀord their
good within the near future. Therefore the market size and expected profits for each firm will be determined
by the overall growth rate of the economy, the patent length and the level of inequality. The entry decision is
then made only if the expected profits are large enough to justify the R&D costs. With ongoing innovations
and income growth a monopolist j decides whether or not to enter the market. Let η denote the length of the
patent the monopolist is granted in case it enters the market. Let μ denote the length of time it takes until
the poor can aﬀord to buy good j which is consumed only by the rich at the time of decision. The value of
the most recent innovator j at time t can then be written as
4Note that for each case the output can be written as follows:
Case 1: Ynew(t) = (1−φ)L(n(t)−cc(t)) , Yold(t) = (1−φ)L(cr(t)−n(t))+cp(t).Case 2: Ynew(t) = φLcp(t)+(1−φ)L(n(t)−cc(t))
, Yold(t) = (1−φ)L(cr(t)−n(t))+cc(t).Case 3: Ynew(t) = L(n(t)−cc(t)) , Yold(t) = (1−φ)L(cr(t)−n(t))+φL(cp(t)−n(t))+cc(t)
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vj(t) = π
Z t+η
t
Dj(τ)e−r(τ−t)dτ = (9)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
π
R t+η
t (1− φ)Le
−r(τ−t)dτ for μ > η
π
R t+μ
t (1− φ)Le−r(τ−t)dτ + πe−rμ
R t+η
t+μ Le
−r(τ−(t+μ))dτ for 0 < μ ≤ η
π
R t+η
t Le
−r(τ−t)dτ for μ ≤ 0
where Dj(τ) is demand for firm j at time τ and L stands for population. Three possible values refer to
the cases. 1) The monopolist serves only the rich until the patent expires. 2) The monopolist serves first the
rich and then the whole population until the patent expires. 3) The monopolist serves the whole population
until the patent expires. Note that as long as the patents do not expire before the poor can aﬀord the firm’s
product there will be a jump in the expected demand for the product at date t+ from (1− φ)L to L. Solving
the above integral yields the value of the most recent innovator j.
vj =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
πL
r (1− φ)(1− e−rη) for μ > η, or
πL
r [(1− φ) + φe−rμ − e−rη] for 0 < μ ≤ η
πL
r (1− e−rη) for μ ≤ 0
(10)
Given μ ≤ η, it is clear that a shorter μ implies less discounting and a higher value for the firm. The value
of the firm when the poor are able to aﬀord the product becomesπLr
£
1− e−r/η−μ)
¤
. This value will then drop
until the patent expires. The amount of time, μ, that will pass until the jump in demand can be found by
making use of the following relation; hp(t+ μ) = hp(t)egμ = j .
μ = −(1/g) ln(hp(t)/j) > 0 (11)
A higher growth rate or a smaller distance between the most advanced good that the poor can aﬀord and
the monopolist firm’s product j implies a shorter time until the demand jump. Substituting dp(j) =
hp(t)
j and
equation (0) in (9) gives:
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vj(t) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
πL
r (1− φ)(1− e−rη) if μ > η , or
πL
r
h
(1− φ) + φd
r
g
p (j)− e−rη
i
if 0 < μ ≤ η
πL
r (1− e−rη) if μ ≤ 0
(12)
Proposition 1. A higher relative consumption position of the poor , dp, increases the profitability of an
innovation if and only if 0 < μ ≤ η. If the inequality is low enough such that hp(t) > j, (i.e.μ < 0) a further
decrease in inequality does not affect the value of the monopolistic firm j
Fixing the patent length implies that for a suﬃciently high μ the firms will never realize the increase in
profit flow obtained by selling to the poor5. As long as hp(t) < j a shorter μ implies a higher growth rate and
vice versa. Regardless of the inequality level a higher growth rate has two eﬀects: 1) A higher interest rate.
Future profits have to be discounted at a higher rate which reduces the firm’s value. 2) A shorter time period
until the poor can aﬀord the firm’s product. The sales to the poor are realized faster which increases the
profitability of innovation, and hence the firm’s value. If the inequality is suﬃciently high then an increase in
demand will never occur because the firm’s patent will expire before the poor can aﬀord to buy the product.
In this case the second eﬀect diminishes. Thus a higher growth rate means a lower value for the monopolist
when it enters the market. On the other hand, if the inequality is suﬃciently low, the second eﬀect again
diminishes, since there is no waiting time.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Entry, Exit and the Partial Equilibrium
Let’s consider the most recent innovator n. For a profitable entry the innovation costs (ard(t)w(t) = ardaold )
should not exceed the reward for an innovation. Assuming free access to R&D technology implies there are
zero profits in equilibrium .That is ardaold ≥ vn(t) When the innovations take place this condition holds with
equality. This zero profit condition implies that the current costs of an innovation must not be smaller than
current returns which are simply the innovation costs discounted by the interest rate. Moreover, in equilibrium
5Setting η =∞ produces the value of the monopolist in Zweimuller(2000) as a special case.
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the interest rate is determined by the growth rate as in equation (2). The entry condition can be written as:
ard
aold
(g + ρ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
πL(1− φ)(1− e−(g+ρ)η) if μ > η , or
πL
∙
(1− φ) + φd
g+ρ
g
p − e−(g+ρ)η
¸
if 0 < μ ≤ η
πL(1− e−(g+ρ)η) if μ ≤ 0
(13)
where dp = dp(n) =
hp(t)
n is the poor’s consumption position.
3.2 General Equilibrium
A general equilibrium in this model is a situation in which the following conditions hold simultaneously. 1)
Consumers maximize their life-time utility subject to their temporal budget constraint and initial wealth. 2)
Firms maximize profits. 3) The resource constraint holds. The firm’s and the consumers optimal decisions
and the zero profit equilibria were dealt with in previous sections. Equation (13) states the partial equilibrium
condition on the firm’s side. The optimal consumption choice in (3) and the resource constraint in (8) together
with the partial equilibrium condition in (13) form a set of equations which describe the general equilibrium in
this economy. To incorporate the wealth distribution into the general equilibrium framework we also make use
of equation (5). Using algebra , which is omitted here, the system can be reduced to the following equations
in the unknowns of dp and g for each case.
dp =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
L
aold
∙
γp[1−(1−φ)[anew(1−dc)−(aold−1)]]+γr(1−φ)
(γr(1−φ)L+γp)
¸
− g ardγp
aold(γr(1−φ)L+γp)
if μ > η
1
aold
+ γp
∙
L−aolddc−(1−φ)L[anew(1−dc)+1−aold]− anewaold Lφ
L[aold(1−φ)γr+anewφγp]
¸
− g ardγp
L[aold(1−φ)γr+anewφγp]
if 0 < μ ≤ η
1
aold
+ γp
h
L−anew[L(1−dc)]−aolddc−(1−aold)L
aoldL
i
− g ardγpaoldL((1−φ)γr+φγp) if μ ≤ 0
(14)
where (1 − φ)γr + φγp = 1. Equation (14) is simply a negative linear relation between g and dp which
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holds in equilibrium. It reflects the optimal consumption choices and the resource constraints. Now, we can
restate the no-profit condition in (13) as:
ard
aold
(g + ρ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
πL(1− φ)(1− d
g+ρ
g
c ) if μ > η , or
πL
∙
(1− φ) + φd
g+ρ
g
p − d
g+ρ
g
c
¸
if 0 < μ ≤ η
πL(1− d
g+ρ
g
c ) if μ ≤ 0
(15)
Equation (15) reflects the no-profit condition on the firm’s side. Note that for μ > η and μ ≤ 0, the growth
rate is independent of the position of the poor dp which is as expected. Below we present the figures that
represent the above conditions.
Figure 2 depicts the possible equilibria of the model6 . The P curves represent equation (15) and Q curves
represent equation (14). The numbers I, II and III refer to the initial demand patterns (cases) when μ > η,
0 < μ ≤ η and μ ≤ 0, respectively. In case I, whatever the patent length, the poor can not aﬀord to buy
the monopolists product during its life-cycle. The poor’s position, dp, is irrelevant to the firm’s decision. In
other words, any change in growth rate which will change the poor’s position will in turn not aﬀect the firm’s
prospects in that it doesn’t expect a demand jump in the future. This is shown by PI .
The definition of dp implies that above a certain level ( dp = 1) the entering firm’s products will be bought
by the poor regardless of the growth rate or the patent length during its life-cycle. This case is shown by
PIII . For given levels of patent length and the poor’s population share equation (15) implies that PIII lies to
the right of PI . If there is a possibility of a demand jump during the life-cycle of the firm, then the poor’s
position will determine the entry rate. The poor’s position and the growth rate will be linked in a non-linear
way as in the second line of equation(15). This situation is shown by PII . The economy will operate in I
for a low g and dp combination, in II for a medium g and dp combination and in III for a high g and dp
combination. For all levels of dp the Q curve is a negatively sloped, straight line. The reason that a higher
dp implies a lower growth rate in each case is due to more resources being are diverted towards production
of consumer goods instead to R&D. Using equation (14) it is possible to show that the dp- intercept of Q
becomes larger when moving from I to III. The intuition is simply that when there is no growth all resources
6We use baseline parameters of φ = 0.7, ρ = 0.02, η = 20, π = 1, L = 1, ardaold = 0.7.
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are used for consumption which solely determines the poor’s position dp.The thick line combining PI ,PII and
PIII represents the set of unique equilibria. For all levels of dp the Q curve is a negatively sloped, straight
line. The reason that a higher dp implies a lower growth rate in each case is due to more resources being are
diverted towards production of consumer goods instead to R&D.
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 3
For given parameters, the slope of Q becomes larger when switching from I to II, but becomes smaller
again when switching from II to III with III still being higher than I. This deserves some discussion. The slope
of Q is determined by the fraction of resources diverted to production of consumption goods and, except in
case III, by the inequality level. If more growth can be achieved for a unit of consumption forgone, than it
must be the case that initially few resources are diverted to R&D. The slope of Q is small, as in case I. Note
that the fraction of resources diverted to production of consumption goods is higher in case I and III than
in II to achieve the same level of increase in dp. The intuition here is twofold: first, for both the poor and
the rich it is optimal to smooth consumption whenever there arises a possibility of an increase in wealth and
consumption in the near future by doing so. In such a case the slope of the Q curve will be higher. Second,
diverted resources are increasingly used in the new goods sector, which is more eﬃcient. This reduces the
R&D resources which have to be sacrificed in order to achieve the same level of consumption. In case III the
first eﬀect is absent, and in case I both eﬀects are absent. As a result, the slope of QII is higher than QIII
both of which are higher than QI .
The equilibrium (dp, g) pair is found at the intersection of P and Q curves.
3.3 Uniqueness
A unique general equilibrium exists if and only if the conditions on time preference are such that dp is
continuous and strictly increasing in growth rate in the no-profit condition (15). Such a situation is presented
by the thick line in Figure 2. As the growth rate changes, it is possible to switch from one case to another.
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Uniqueness of equilibrium requires that the switch, which is shown by the arrows, be continuous without any
jumps in growth rate. In other words, a (dp, g) pair should exist above which the PI(PII) curve smoothly
connects to PII(PIII).
In case I and case III the equilibrium growth rate is solely determined by the positions of PI and PIII .
This is evident in equation 15 where the first and the third line does not include the term dp.
Each equilibrium situation depends on the length of the time period μ which is determined not only by
the growth rate but also the poor’s purchasing power and the patent length η.If we relax the conditions on
the time preference the model exhibits multiple equilibria as shown in Figure 3. An increase in the time
preference, ρ, changes the intercept and the curvature of PII curve whereas it shifts PI and PIII to the left
as shown by the arrows. Multiple equilibria occur only in case II where for a suﬃciently large ρ there exists
more than one zero-profit equilibrium.
4 Applications
4.1 Inequality and Growth1
Since an analytical solution is not attainable, we provide the arguments based on the numerical methods
and associated graphs. We distinguished earlier between the three initial conditions (I, II, III) and their
implications for the model’s behavior. Below, the eﬀects of inequality on growth in each of those cases are
analyzed. Case I and case III deal with very high and very low inequality respectively, whereas case II deals
with a wide range of inequalities from high to low.
Since the patent length determines the state of this economy it is initially kept fixed to isolate the eﬀects
of inequality on growth. Later, this assumption is relaxed to consider the eﬀects of patent length on growth
at each level of inequality. Both the poor’s share of wealth γp and the poor’s share of population, φ, are used
as a proxy to inequality. Note that whether looking eﬀects of γp or φ the Lorentz relation given in (5) has
to hold. For instance, any increase in γp is coupled by an appropriate decrease in γr keeping φ fixed. We
summarize the main arguments in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. i) If μ > η, a lower population share of the poor φ, holding poor’s share of wealth γp
increases the growth rate g, whereas an increase in γp, holding φ constant , leads to a higher g if and only if
∆γp is positive and suﬃciently large. ii) If 0 < μ < η , a lower φ increases g only if the initial consumption
position of the poor relative to the entry position of the monopolist firm dp is suﬃciently low, whereas an
increase in γp leads to an unambiguous increase in g. iii) If μ ≤ 0, a lower population share of the poor(φ)
or an increase in the wealth of the poor( γp) does not have any eﬀect on the growth rate.
Proof. See appendix.
When waiting time until demand jump is bounded below by the patent duration, transferring wealth to
the poor might not aﬀect growth because innovators might have a ‘too short’ life. On the other hand, when
the poor can already aﬀord most of the new goods, reducing inequality by increasing the population share
of the rich might increase the entering firms market size less than it does the incumbent, luxuries producers.
The production becomes less eﬃcient and less resources are diverted to R&D reducing growth. Obviously,
the first result is obtained by virtue of fixed patent length. Second result would hold even if patent length is
infinite, however, compared to an infinitely lived monopolist, the marginal eﬀect of a reduction in φ on the
profit flow, and therefore on the entry rate, is higher for a finitely lived monopolist, This is because the profit
flow is spread over a fixed horizon.
Proposition 3. If 0 < μ < η ,the eﬀect of a change in φ on the entry rate is decreasing in patent length,
η.
Proof. See appendix.
4.2 Patent Length, Growth and Redistribution
The eﬀects of patent policies on growth has attracted a lot of interest in the literature. On the one hand patents
create mark-ups, distorting relative prices and thus reducing welfare; on the other hand they stimulate R&D
by increasing profitability of innovations and cause dynamic eﬃciency gains. For tractability purposes, in this
model it is assumed that the firms do not mark-up during their finite monopolistic life, which implies that
the optimal patent length is infinite. By imposing finite patent lengths, however, one is able to distinguish
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between diﬀerent levels of inequality which will matter to the firm’s decision to innovate.
Figure 4 shows the patent length as proxied inversely by dc on y-axis and growth on x-axis. The figure is
drawn after the model is adjusted to the feasible inequality parameters for case II. The growth is maximized
at dc = 0 which amounts to infinite patent length. An increase in patent length unambiguously increases
the growth rate and the poor’s consumption. The decreasing slope as we Longer patents reduce the eﬀect of
inequality by increasing the likelihood that the firms benefit from a future demand jump from the sales to the
poor.
One interesting issue is how the patent length and growth relate at diﬀerent levels of wealth inequality.
As the wealth inequality increases the curve shifts outward and its slope becomes flatter. At high levels of
inequality a unit increase in patent length increases growth more than it does at low levels of inequality. When
the poor’s population share is high the potential increase in profitability is higher in case of a demand jump.
An increase in patent length makes such higher gains more likely.
FIGURE 4
Limited monopoly duration introduces threshold eﬀects in redistributive policies. In a dynamic context,
the size of the markets is determined by the patent lengths and with the hierarchic preferences not every
redistribution is high enough to make the poor purchase the eﬃcient product during the product’s lifetime.
For instance, in a high inequality situation, a suﬃcient redistribution to increase growth is the one which
increases the wealth of the poor by at least 232% when the patent length parameter, dc, is equal to 0.27
5 Conclusion
We presented above a general equilibrium model which accounted for the nonlinear relationship between
inequality and innovation-driven growth. Unlike previous models of demand-induced growth the patent length
is taken to be fixed which introduces some interesting equilibrium dynamics. At high and low levels of
7When the growth rate is 5% this is equivalent of a patent length of 32 years. With a 3% growth rate it is equivalent to 53
years.
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inequality, an increase in inequality might have no eﬀect or opposite eﬀects on growth depending on the
patent length. The mechanics of the model is such that the entering firm’s potential market size determines
the level of growth, whereas the market size is determined by the inequality level, the patent length and the
growth rate. Furthermore, it is shown that in this setup an increase in patent length increases growth, a result
also confirmed by previous studies. The magnitude of a change in inequality on growth, on the other hand,
diﬀers with respect to the duration of patents.
In this paper, growth is driven by innovations which are protected by patents of finite length. Innovators
are subject to displacement only after their patents expire and they are displaced by other more eﬃcient
competitive producers, if any. A range of equilibria is characterized by a situation where the poor can not
aﬀord all the products available on the market and the innovators face a demand jump but not until the poor
are rich enough to purchase the new product. The waiting time, in turn, depends both on the growth rate and
the inequality level. The length of time that a monopolist sells its product to the whole population instead of
just to the rich is not determined solely by the inequality level but also by the patent length and the growth
rate of the economy.
The model presented here is open to modifications and further enhancements. For instance, allowing for
mark-ups creates a possibility for a finite optimal patent length due to static price distortions. The negative
welfare eﬀect of distorted relative prices would then counterbalance the dynamic eﬃciency gain of infinite
patents. A general solution of the model will considerably be more diﬃcult, however. First the price structure
would not reflect the cost structure and consumer purchases would not be eﬃciently spread over varieties.
The equilibrium could then be described by non-linear delayed diﬀerential equations.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2.
Case I : μ > η
1) Lower population share of the poor φ : Keeping the poor’s consumption position fixed, a lower population
share of the poor unambiguously increases the growth rate as in Figure A1. P curve shifts right (PI →P0I).
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The demand is higher for the entering firms because more people can aﬀord their products. This increases
profitability and induces more entry. At the same time the demand for the consumption goods by the poor
falls but the demand for all consumption goods increase. This is simply due the change in the composition of
the population. The composition of demand shifts towards new and more eﬃcient goods instead of ‘luxuries’
leaving more resources for R&D. For a unit the poor forgo more growth can be achieved because of this
increased eﬃciency. This means that the new Q curve (Q0I) has a lower slope. At the new equilibrium,
the growth rate (g01) is higher. The eﬀect on the poor’s consumption depends on the eﬃciency of the new
technology. The more eﬃcient the new technology the higher is the poor’s consumption.
2) Higher wealth share of the poor γp : A small increase of the poor’s share of wealth does not aﬀect the
growth rate. A small wealth increase is insuﬃcient to make the poor’s consumption choices diﬀer enough
to include the new goods before their patent expiration. As long as the poor’s consumption stays within a
certain range, the economy will operate as in case I and any eﬀects on profitability are ruled out. As a result
PI curve does not shift. The range of wealth for which an increase does not eﬀect growth can be found by
making use of the equilibrium conditions and the Lorentz equation (5). A suﬃcient increase in wealth which
would switch the model from I to II and increase the growth rate must be at least 232% using the parameters
specified as above for dp ≤ dc = 0.2, In Figure A2 a small increase in wealth rotates the curve QI clockwise
around (g1,dp1) but does not aﬀect the PI curve. It can be shown that PI lies to the left of (g1,dp1) for the
parameters above8 and the increase in wealth actually improves poor’s consumption.
Case II : 0 < μ < η
1) Lower population share of the poor φ : When inequality is high, a lower population share of the poor
shifts and rotates the Q curve (QIIa →Q0IIa) and rotates the PII curve around (g2, dp2)in Figure A3. The shift
in both curves implies that up to a certain level of dp a lower population share of the poor increases growth.
The increase in the growth rate is diminishing as a result of two opposite eﬀects. First, as the growth rate
increases so does the interest rate. The future profits have to be discounted at a higher rate which reduces the
entering firm’s value. Fewer firms enter the market. This has a negative eﬀect on growth. Second, the sales
to the poor are realized faster due to improving purchasing power which increases profitability. The returns
to innovation are therefore higher, which has a positive eﬀect on growth. Fewer resources are spent on the
8 It turns out that (g, dp)=(0.32, 0.18) and g1 = 0.08 in Figure A2
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production of luxuries improving eﬃciency and enhancing growth. When the inequality is low, the Q curve
sits above (g2, dp2) and is shown by QIIb. A lower population share of the poor reduces growth. A decrease
in the poor’s population increases the demand for the luxuries (j > n) more than it does the demand for new
goods.
2) Higher wealth share of the poor γp :
An increase in wealth of the poor rotates the QII curve around (g2,dp2) in Figure A3. It can be shown
that P curve lies to right of (g2,dp2) labeled as PIIa. An increase in the wealth of the poor then unambiguously
increases the growth rate when the inequality is high (g2a → g
0
2a). An increase in the wealth of the poor
increases the poor’s consumption and speeds up the anticipated demand jump for the entering firms. A lower
population share of the poor rotates the PII curve around (g2, dp2) .
Case III: μ ≤ 0
A lower population share of the poor does not have any eﬀect on growth or poor’s consumption when
the inequality is suﬃciently small. Note that the last part of (14) and (15) are independent of the poor’s
population share, φ. An increase in the wealth of the poor has no eﬀect on the PIII curve in Figure A4. It
rotates the Q curve counter-clockwise.
FIGURE A1-A4
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider the case II. Let vfin(t) denote the value of a monopolist with a patent length of η < ∞ and
vinf(t) denote the value of a monopolist with a patent length of η =∞. One can show by substituting dp from
the equilibrium condition (14) in (12), taking the derivative with respect to φ and after some algebra that
∂vfin(t)
∂φ >
∂vinf(t)
∂φ .
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